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A note on multiple equilibria and punitive damages rules in "everybody out of the pool"

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 14 (1998) 2, pp. 379-387

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001353734

Everybody out of the pool : products liability, punitive damages, and competition

Daughety, Andrew F. - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 13 (1997) 2, pp. 410-432

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001232694

Product safety : liability, R&D, and signaling

Daughety, Andrew F. - In: The American economic review 85 (1995) 5, pp. 1187-1206

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001202033

Market structure, liability, and product safety

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer Freidel - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011861740

Cumulative harm and resilient liability rules for product markets

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer Freidel - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 30 (2014) 2, pp. 371-400

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467311

Products liability, signaling and disclosure

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer Freidel - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 164 (2008) 1, pp. 106-126

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003667074

Products liability, signaling and disclosure : comment

Klement, Alon; Neeman, Zvika - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 164 (2008) 1, pp. 130-133

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003667083

Markets, torts and social inefficiency

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer Freidel - In: The Rand journal of economics 37 (2006) 2, pp. 300-323

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003410516

Secrecy and safety

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer Freidel - In: The American economic review 95 (2005) 4, pp. 1074-1091

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003198999

Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure

Daughety, Andrew F. - 2007

In this paper we examine the behavior of a firm that produces a product with a privately-observed safety attribute; that is, consumers cannot observe directly the product's safety. The firm may, at a cost, disclose its safety prior to sale; alternatively, if a firm does not disclose its safety...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012731013