We examine the impact of airline codesharing on consumer choice behavior in non-stop international route markets. Using stated preference data, we document that consumer valuation of flights by alien foreign carriers is significantly higher if these flights are offered as codeshare products by...

We examine how mergers affect quality provision by analyzing five U.S. airline mergers, focusing on on-time performance (OTP). We find that airline mergers have minimal negative impacts on OTP, and likely result in long-run improvements due to efficiencies. Importantly, we show that this finding...

We examine how competition impacts the provision of product quality. Using a unique data set of inflight amenities provided by U.S. airlines, we find that the composition of competition matters with significantly higher product quality (Wi-Fi, entertainment, and power) on more competitive routes...

We examine the impact of airline codesharing on consumer choice behavior in non-stop international route markets. Using stated preference data, we document that consumer valuation of flights by alien foreign carriers is significantly higher if these flights are offered as codeshare products by...

This paper examines the impact of labor unions on firms' quality provisions through the lens of the U.S. airline industry. Leveraging quarterly carrier-route level data on flight frequencies and on-time performance from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics from 1993 to 2019, our...

In this paper we study the impact of competition on the provision of quality in the US airline industry. Using changes in competition triggered by LCC entry and airline mergers, we find that an increase in competition increases the provision of quality of major incumbent and non-merging airlines...

Imposing a minimum quality standard (MQS) is conventionally regarded as harmful if firms compete in quantities. This, however, ignores its possible dynamic effects. We show that an MQS can hinder collusion, resulting in dynamic welfare gains that reduce and may outweigh the static losses which...

Two firms produce different qualities at possibly different, constant marginal costs. They compete in quantities on a market where buyers only observe the average quality supplied. The model is a generalization of the standard Cournot duopoly, which corresponds to the special case where the two...

We study an asymmetric information model in which two firms are active on a market where buyers only observe the average quality supplied. Quantities and cost structures are exogenously given and firms compete in quality. Before choosing their qualities, they bargain over a perfectly enforcable...

Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product...