Trueman (1986) theorizes that managers voluntarily issue earnings forecasts to signal their ability. Consistent with this theory, we find that the likelihood and frequency of management earnings forecast issuance increase with CEO ability, as proxied by (i) press citations, (ii) a measure...

This study examines whether and why the stock market assigns an incremental premium to the act of beating analyst earnings forecasts when the economy is unforecastable. Our study uses a novel measure of macroeconomic (macro) uncertainty from Jurado et al. (2015) that captures periods during...

Managers have great discretion in determining management forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. In this paper, we examine whether managers strategically choose the precision of their earnings forecasts for self-serving...

Managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. This paper examines whether managers strategically choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Building on the prior finding that the...

We examine how short sellers affect long-run management forecasts using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO) that relaxes short-selling constraints on a group of randomly selected firms (referred to as pilot firms). We find that compared to other firms, the pilot firms issue more long-run good...

We examine the effect of the common ownership relation between brokerage houses and the firms covered by their analysts (referred to as co-owned brokerage houses, co-owned firms, and connected analysts, respectively) on analyst forecast performance. Common ownership can help the connected...