We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question....

There are two standard versions for one-shot oligopoly games: the Cournot game and the Bertrand game. The common feature is that in both games the strategic variables are supply curves. Under Cournot the supply curves are vertical lines in price-quantity space, under Bertrand they are horizontal...

We build a game-theoretic model to examine how better demand forecasting due to algorithms, machine learning and artificial intelligence affects the sustainability of collusion in an industry. We find that while better forecasting allows colluding firms to better tailor prices to demand...

We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question....

So far, if one wished to analyse economic markets in all their complexity - i.e. by incorporating all information regarding firm and consumer behavior available from the fields of economics, marketing, consumer research, competitive strategy, and business analysis - she had to use formulas with...

We examine whether financial analysts understand the effect of unionization on firm earnings in the U.S. by examining a large panel dataset with firm-level unionization, adoptions of right-to-work (RTW) laws, and union certification elections. We find that forecast errors for unionized firms in...