We analyze the determinants of individual bank failures arising from solvency and liquidity shortages in a stylized banking system following Krause and Giansante (2012) where banks are characterized by the amount of capital, cash reserves and their exposure to the interbank loan market as...

This paper considers the issue of forecasting financial fragility of banks and insurances using a panel data set of performance indicators, namely distance-to- default, taking unobserved common factors into account. We show that common factors are important in the performance of banks and...

Banking reform has proved to be one of the most problematic elements of economic transition in central and Eastern Europe. Therefore the paper considers the development of the Estonian banking sector and derives individual banks´ fragility scores during transition. To this end we use...

Liquidity mismatch—the risk of a bank being unable to fund increases in assets or meet its obligations as they come due—increased in the U.S. banking sector during the run-up to the financial crisis, especially at the largest institutions, contributing to bank failure and distress

We develop a stock-flow-consistent agent-based model that comprises a realistic mechanism of money creation and parametrize it to fit actually observed data. The model is used to make out-of-sample projections of broad money and credit developments under the commencement/termination of foreign...

The Great Recession has been characterised by the two stylized facts: the buildup of leverage in the household sector in the period preceding the recession and a protracted economic recovery that followed. We attempt to explain these two facts as an information friction, whereby agents are...

This article analyzes the manifold situations in which the efficient-market hypothesis (EMH) has influenced — or has failed to influence — federal securities regulation and state corporate law, and the prospective roles for the EMH in these contexts. In federal securities regulation, the EMH...

Risky banks that endanger the stability of the financial system should pay higher deposit insurance premiums than healthy banks and other financial institutions that have shown good financial performance. It is necessary, therefore, to have at least a dual fair premium rate system. In this...