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Optimal time-based and cost-based coordinated project contracts with unobservable work rates

Kwon, H. Dharma; Lippman, Steven A.; Tang, Christopher S. - In: International journal of production economics 126 (2010) 2, pp. 247-254

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003995298

Project management contracts with delayed payments

Kwon, H. Dharma; Lippman, Steven A.; McCardle, Kevin F.; … - In: Manufacturing & service operations management : M & SOM 12 (2010) 4, pp. 692-707

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008702756

Using Nash bargaining to design project management contracts under cost uncertainty

Lippman, Steven A.; McCardle, Kevin F.; Tang, Christopher S. - In: International journal of production economics 145 (2013) 1, pp. 199-207

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785302

Project design with limited commitment and teams

Georgiadis, George; Lippman, Steven A.; Tang, Christopher S. - In: The Rand journal of economics 45 (2014) 3, pp. 598-623

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010423871

Incentive contracts for managing a project with uncertain completion time

Tang, Christopher S.; Zhang, Kairen; Zhou, Sean X. - In: Production and operations management : an international … 24 (2015) 12, pp. 1945-1954

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011428193

Project contracting strategies for managing team dynamics

Georgiadis, George; Tang, Christopher S. - In: Handbook of information exchange in supply chain management, (pp. 89-105). 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550590

Tang, Christopher S.; Zhang, Kairen; Zhou, Sean X. - In: Handbook of information exchange in supply chain management, (pp. 107-122). 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550593

A queueing model for managing small projects under uncertainties

Bai, Jiaru; So, Kut C.; Tang, Christopher S. - In: European journal of operational research : EJOR 253 (2016) 3, pp. 777-790

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011494081

Project Contracting Strategies for Managing Team Dynamics

Georgiadis, George - 2016

In this chapter we study a team dynamic problem in which a group of agents collaborate over time to complete a project. The project progresses at a rate that depends on the agents' efforts, and it generates a payoff upon completion. First, we show that agents work harder the closer the project...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012999755