We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long …

renegotiation. If the buyer expects renegotiation always to take place, the parties are always able to implement the materially … efficient good ex post. It can be optimal for the buyer, however, to expect that renegotiation does not take place. In this case …

We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long …

renegotiation. If the buyer expects renegotiation always to take place, the parties are always able to implement the materially … efficient good ex post. It can be optimal for the buyer, however, to expect that renegotiation does not take place. In this case …

renegotiation. If the buyer expects renegotiation always to take place, the parties are always able to implement the materially … efficient good ex post. It can be optimal for the buyer, however, to expect that renegotiation does not take place. In this case …

We propose a theory of inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long …

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and …

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation. If …). Bilateral negotiations are superior if potential design improvements are important, if renegotiation is particularly costly, and …