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Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes: An experiment
Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010
interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287731
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Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes : an experiment
Puttermann, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010
interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011344858
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Bargaining in the presence of condorcet cycles : the role of asymmetries
Kamm, Aaron; Houba, Harold - 2015
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment studying the role of asymmetries, both in payoffs and recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532580
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How transparency kills information aggregation : (and why that may be a good thing) ; conference paper
Fehrler, Sebastian; Hughes, Niall - 2014
We show theoretical and experimental results that demonstrate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision making and deliberation. We present a model in which committee members have career concerns and unanimity is needed to change the status quo. We study three scenarios -...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010486059
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Voting as a war of attrition
Kwiek, Maksymilian; Marreiros, Helia; Vlassopoulos, Michael - 2018
more often than simple majority. In a series of laboratory experiments, we investigate how various rules affect the outcome …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872697
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Governing collective action in the face of observational error
Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis G.; Wang, Liangjun - 2017
We present results from a repeated public goods experiment where subjects choose by vote one of two sanctioning schemes: peer-to-peer (informal) or centralized (formal). We introduce, in some treatments, a moderate amount of noise (a 10 percent probability that a contribution is reported...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011708190
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Competitive equilibrium in markets for votes
Casella, Alessandra; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Palfrey, … - 2012
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy … market for votes generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough or the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286692
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How transparency kills information aggregation : theory and experiment
Fehrler, Sebastian; Hughes, Niall - 2015
affects information aggregation at the deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different committee error rates than …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010516456
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An experimental study of voting with costly delay
Kwiek, Maksymilian; Marreiros, Helia; Vlassopoulos, Michael - 2015
A conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sufficient supermajority … conclave leads to efficiency gains relative to simple majority voting. We also compare welfare properties of a static versus a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011336977
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Social preferences and voting on reform : an experimental study
Paetzel, Fabian; Sausgruber, Rupert; Traub, Stefan - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360793