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The myth of democratic failure : why political institutions are efficient

Wittman, Donald A. - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013481084

Targeted political advertising and strategic behavior by uninformed voters

Wittman, Donald A. - In: Economics of governance 9 (2008) 1, pp. 87-100

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003647963

Conclusion: Hobbes and the political economy of power

Wittman, Donald A. - In: Democracy, freedom and coercion : a law and economics …, (pp. 251-266). 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003775191

Hobbes and the political economy of power

Wittman, Donald A. (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003589927

The end of special interests theory and the beginning of a more positive view of democratic politics

Wittman, Donald A. - In: Government and markets : toward a new theory of regulation, (pp. 193-212). 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014563522

District versus at-large voting : why district voting results in worse policy for minorities

Wittman, Donald A. - In: European journal of political economy 81 (2024), pp. 1-14

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014547026

Implementation with partial verification

Singh, Nirvikar; Wittman, Donald A. - In: Review of economic design : RED 6 (2001) 1, pp. 63-84

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001575368

Implementation with Partial Verification

Wittman, Donald; Singh, Nirvikar - 2001

This paper examines the implementability of social choice functions when only partial verification of private information is possible. Green and Laffont (1986) used this framework to derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the revelation principle to continue to hold with partial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014142409