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The costs of favoritism : is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010
World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003948233
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The costs of favoritism : is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010
World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944718
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The costs of favoritism : is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel (contributor) - 2010
World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336343
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The Costs of Favoritism : Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?
Dreher, Axel - 2010
World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146443
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The Costs of Favoritism : Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?
Dreher, Axel - 2010
World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146478
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The Costs of Favoritism : Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2021
World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316223
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The costs of favoritism : is politically driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - In: Economic development and cultural change 62 (2013) 1, pp. 157-191
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336273
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Buying votes and international organizations
Dreher, Axel; Vreeland, James Raymond - 2011
This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009126428
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Geopolitics, aid and growth
Dreher, Axel; Eichenauer, Vera; Gehring, Kai - 2013
We investigate the effects of short-term political motivations on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Donor countries ́political motives might reduce the effectiveness of conditionality, channel aid to inferior projects or affect the way aid is spent in other ways, reduce the aid bureaucracyś...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009764394
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Geopolitics, aid and growth
Dreher, Axel; Eichenauer, Vera; Gehring, Kai - 2014
We investigate the effects of short-term political motivations on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Specifically, we test whether the effect of aid on economic growth is reduced by the share of years a country has served on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the period the aid has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010425577