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Governments do not have perfect information regarding the priorities and the needs of different groups in the economy. This lack of knowledge opens the door for different groups to lobby the government in order to receive the government's support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412469
We study communication in committees selecting one of two alternatives when consensus is required and agents have private information about their preferences. Delaying the decision is costly, so a form of multiplayer war of attrition emerges. Waiting allows voters to express the intensity of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872697
Since the early 1980s a wave of liberalizing reforms has swept over the world. While the stated motivation for these reforms has usually been to increase economic efficiency, some critics have instead inferred ulterior motives and a desire to enrich certain (already rich) people at the expense...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011917073
Preventive policy measures such as bailouts often pass parliament very narrowly. We present a model of asymmetric information between politicians and voters which rationalizes this narrow parliamentary outcome. A successful preventive policy impedes the verification of its own necessity. When...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580163
economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost … foregone. -- public goods ; competition ; tournament ; cooperation ; voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009548053
We consider a committee voting setup with two rounds of voting where committee members who possess private information … information in the first voting period. Coughlan (2000) shows that members reveal their information in a straw poll only if their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430746
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment studying the role of asymmetries, both in payoffs and recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532580
Using data from an experiment by Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993), designed for a different purpose, we test the "standard theory" that players have preferences only over their own mentary payoffs and that play will be in (evolutionary stable) equilibrium. In the experiment each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011284229
This paper considers the implications of an important cognitive bias in information processing, confirmation bias, in a political agency setting. In the baseline two-period case where only the politician's actions are observable before the election, we show that when voters have this bias, it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011286492
This paper uses variation in the timing of the Mexican antipoverty program's introduction across municipalities to identify its impact on the share of votes for the local incumbent party. Evidence is found that voters reward the mayor's party for the central benefit to their constituencies,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011289331