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We present a model of political selection in which voters elect a president from a set of candidates. We assume that some of the candidates are benevolent and that all voters prefer a benevolent president, i.e. a president who serves the public interest. Yet, political selection may fail in our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011344857
-interest, providing strong evidence for pocketbook voting. However, social preferences like altruism, public good considerations and … allows quantifying monetary benefits associated with each ticket. We find that turnout is much higher among students who … benefit a lot from having a ticket, suggesting instrumental voting. In each referendum, a majority votes in line with self …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496966
We develop and test a theory of voting and turnout decisions that integrates self-interest, social preferences, and … strongly influence participation and voting. However, social or expressive motives, such as stated altruism, environmental … pocketbook benefits do not explain voting, then voting is expressive. If the perceived probability of being pivotal is non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011657009
We develop and test a theory of voting and turnout decisions that integrates self-interest, social preferences, and … strongly influence participation and voting. However, social or expressive motives, such as stated altruism, environmental … pocketbook benefits do not explain voting, then voting is expressive. If the perceived probability of being pivotal is non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011645032
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011792127
Using data from an experiment by Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993), designed for a different purpose, we test the "standard theory" that players have preferences only over their own mentary payoffs and that play will be in (evolutionary stable) equilibrium. In the experiment each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011284229
probability before the election (Maskin and Tirole's "feedback" case). In the three-period case, with two elections, the dynamic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011286492
In this paper we analyze the consequences of the fairness recommendation of the Venice Commission in allocating voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010197548
The role of electoral incentives vs. selection is ideally analyzed in a setting where the same legislators are selected to decide on policies under different electoral rules and where voter preferences on policies can be precisely measured. This is the first paper to look at such a situation....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012286323
studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values but may be ambiguity averse -- exhibit Ellsberg-type behavior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671890