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Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
Ehlers, Lars H.; Westkamp, Alexander - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1009-1042
-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another … stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: (A) Either there …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937252
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Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi, Matteo - In: International journal of game theory 50 (2021) 1, pp. 105-118
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012499788
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Fairness and efficiency in a random assignment : three impossibility results
Nesterov, Alexander - 2014
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010438227
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An impossibility theorem in matching problems
Takagi, Shohei (contributor);  … - 2006
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003397473
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An Impossibility Theorem in Matching Problems
Takagi, Shohei; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2008
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that efficient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing efficiency to the weaker condition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014053961
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Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability
Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars H.; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674186
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(Group) strategy-proofness and stability in many-to-many matching markets
Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi, Matteo - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699768
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Strategy-proof rule in probabilistic allocation problem of an indivisible good and money
Hashimoto, Kazuhiko - 2015
We consider the problem of probabilistically allocating a single indivisible good among agents when monetary transfers are allowed. We construct a new strategy-proof rule, called the second price trading rule, and show that it is second best efficient. Furthermore, we give the second price...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010504686
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Strategy-proofness and single-crossing
Saporiti, Alejandro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 4 (2009) 2, pp. 127-163
This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699125
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Secure implementation
Saijō, Tatsuyoshi; Sjöström, Tomas; Yamato, Takehiko - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 3, pp. 203-229
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702527