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Group contests with internal conflict and power asymmetry
Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - 2014
We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467392
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Exclusivity of Groups in Contests
Send, Jonas - 2021
I analyse a group contest in which groups decide over two dimensions of membership-exclusivity: whether a member is allowed to join the group at all, and whether this member is allowed to join another group as well. If the prize is mostly private, group leaders do not offer membership in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013323852
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Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy
Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 219-256
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694996
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The influence of political pressure groups on the stability of international environmental agreements
Hagen, Achim; Altamirano Cabrera, Juan Carlos; Weikard, … - 2016
This paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on the emissions abatement decisions of countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists. We determine the influence of lobby-groups on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011517964
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Voting with feet : community choice in social dilemmas
Gürerk, Özgür; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rockenbach, Bettina - 2009
Economic and social interactions often take place in open communities but the dynamics of the community choice process and its impact on cooperation of its members are yet not well understood. We experimentally investigate community choice in social dilemmas. Participants repeatedly choose...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003928119
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Efficiency, welfare, and political competition
Bierbrauer, Felix; Boyer, Pierre C. - 2014
We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share-maximizers. They can propose any policy that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358277
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Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies with State Dependent Preferences and Feasible Sets
Tian, Guoqiang - 1999
This paper considers Bayesian and Nash implementation in exchange economic environments with state dependent preferences and feasible sets. We fully characterize Bayesian implementability for both diffuse and non-diffuse information structures. We show that, in exchange economic environments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014208048
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Stability of Jurisdiction Structures Under the Equal Share and Median Rules
Bogomolnaia, Anna - 2006
In this paper we consider a model with multiple jurisdictions where each formed jurisdiction selects a public project from the given uni-dimensional set, equally shares its cost among its members and places the project at the location of its median resident. We examine a cooperative concept of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734644
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Quadratic Voting : How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy
Lalley, Steven - 2017
Can mechanism design save democracy? We propose a simple design that offers a chance: individuals pay for as many votes as they wish using a number of "voice credits" quadratic in the votes they buy. Only quadratic cost induces marginal costs linear in votes purchased and thus welfare optimality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975457
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Securely Implementable Social Choice Functions in Divisible and Non-Excludable Public Good Economies with Quasi-Linear Utility Functions
Nishizaki, Katsuhiko - 2016
This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo, T., T. Sjöström, and T. Yamato (2007) "Secure Implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp. 203-229) in divisible and non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions. Although Saijo, Sjöström, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006248