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Granting discretion to collusive agencies : the role of the "standing" doctrine
Lehmann, Markus - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011579889
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Prices Versus Quantities : The Political Perspective
Finkelshtain, Israel; Kislev, Yoav - 2008
Regulation regimes subject to the influence of interest groups are compared. It is shown that the allocation of the regulated commodity varies with the implemented control and that the advantage of prices (vs. quotas) increases with the elasticity of the demand for or the supply of the commodity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074616
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Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy
Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 219-256
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694996
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How corruption is and should be investigated by economic theory
Wawrosz, Petr - In: Economies : open access journal 10 (2022) 12, pp. 1-23
The article analyzes how economic theory usually investigates corruption. It describes the main traditional economic … face some problems, especially their neglect of some important factors as to why corruption occurs which prevents them from … environment in which corruption occurs. Redistribution system theory can serve as a useful aid here because it reveals that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013499728
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Winners and losers of early elections : on the welfare implications of political blockades and early elections
Bierbrauer, Felix; Mechtenberg, Lydia - 2008
We develop a dynamic model of political competition. Each party has a policymotivated ideological wing and an office-motivated opportunistic wing. A blockade arises if inner-party conflict stops policy implementation. We use this model to study whether early elections should be used to overcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003796136
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Winners and losers of early elections : on the welfare implications of political blockades and early elections
Bierbrauer, Felix; Mechtenberg, Lydia - 2008
We develop a dynamic model of political competition. Each party has a policymotivated ideological wing and an office-motivated opportunistic wing. A blockade arises if inner-party conflict stops policy implementation. We use this model to study whether early elections should be used to overcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935643
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Political Connections and Allocative Distortions
Schoenherr, David - 2018
Exploiting a unique institutional setting in Korea, this paper documents how politicians can increase the amount of government resources allocated through their social networks to the benefit of private firms connected to these networks. After winning the election, the new president appoints...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012937838
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Majority-Rule Bargaining and the Under Provision of Public Investment Goods
Leblanc, William; Snyder, James M.; Tripathi, Micky - 2001
Despite evidence that modern democracies systematically shortchange public investment goods, relatively little theoretical work exists to explain this phenomenon. We build on Baron and Ferejohn's (American Political Science Review, 83(4) (1989) 1181--1206) bargaining model to describe public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014140583
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A political argument for inefficiency under severe political pressure
Nisani, Doron - In: Journal of government and economics : JGE 12 (2023), pp. 1-13
(seemingly an inefficient allocation, but one that ultimately reduces the public welfare loss) in order to safeguard the public …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014518046
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The Sound of Silence : Anti-Defamation Law and Political Corruption
Gratton, Gabriele - 2013
theoretical foundation to disentangle the effects of media regulation on corruption and clarify under which circumstances … regulation reduces or increases corruption. The analysis shows that libel laws can reduce political corruption only if the moral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041207