Showing 1 - 10 of 201
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We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private values. We provide a short and constructive proof that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014179587
We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus on three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive compatibility has been shown to be necessary for any concept...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196698
The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying implementation on richer type spaces, with more higher order uncertainty. We study the "ex post equivalence" question: When is interim...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082961
This review summarizes a nascent body of theoretical research on design of incentives when the environment is not fully known to the designer and offers some general lessons from the work so far. These recent models based on uncertainty and robustness offer an additional set of tools in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014104462
We show how hard evidence can be incorporated into the mechanism-design framework. We provide a link between real evidence and abstract declarations, which clarifies when the abstract-declaration environment, which was first studied in Green and Laffont's (1986) "limited verifiability" analysis,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105675
The paper explores organizations designed to influence a group to choose specific alternatives from a set of possible choices. The perspective is that of an administrator that has personal objectives not shared by the group and can dictate organization but not group choice. The design works...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014144246
A mechanism is unsafe if a small number of agents deviating unexpectedly can make the mechanism deliver an outcome regarded as bad by a large number of other agents. Under Nash behavior, the direct approach of designing mechanisms with only safe Nash equilibria is impossible in many...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012972905
We consider school choice problems (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) where students are assigned to public schools through a centralized assignment mechanism. We study the family of so-called rank-priority mechanisms, each of which is induced by an order of rank-priority pairs. Following the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955586