We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private values. We provide a short and constructive proof that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that...

We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus on three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive compatibility has been shown to be necessary for any concept...

The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying implementation on richer type spaces, with more higher order uncertainty. We study the "ex post equivalence" question: When is interim...

This review summarizes a nascent body of theoretical research on design of incentives when the environment is not fully known to the designer and offers some general lessons from the work so far. These recent models based on uncertainty and robustness offer an additional set of tools in the...

We show how hard evidence can be incorporated into the mechanism-design framework. We provide a link between real evidence and abstract declarations, which clarifies when the abstract-declaration environment, which was first studied in Green and Laffont's (1986) "limited verifiability" analysis,...

The paper explores organizations designed to influence a group to choose specific alternatives from a set of possible choices. The perspective is that of an administrator that has personal objectives not shared by the group and can dictate organization but not group choice. The design works...

A mechanism is unsafe if a small number of agents deviating unexpectedly can make the mechanism deliver an outcome regarded as bad by a large number of other agents. Under Nash behavior, the direct approach of designing mechanisms with only safe Nash equilibria is impossible in many...