We outline a new voting procedure for representative democracies. This procedure should be used for important decisions only and consists of two voting rounds: a randomly-selected subset of the citizens is awarded a one-time voting right. The parliament also votes, and the two decisions are...

In this paper, we consider the problem that a benevolent designer wants to provide a non-excludable public good with a fixed cost to agents with privately known valuations. Adopting utilitarian's point of view, the designer maximizes the ex-ante total utility of all agents. The impossibility...

In a recent paper, Sprumont (1991) showed that the uniform rule (Benassy, 1982) on the single-peaked domain (Black, 1948) is the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity, and efficiency. This result motivates us to investigate whether there is a larger domain on which there exists...

The Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) used by the Council of the European Union developed to a high degree of complexity from one modifying treaty to another, until the latest definition stipulated in the Treaty of Lisbon. This paper analyses this EU intra-institutional voting method using a...

In this paper, a micro-founded model dealing with the effects of regional sizing on economic growth is developed. Departing from bigger sizes, reduction involves more efficient public choices because of proximity to individual preferences and needs, but also creates the risk of underestimation...

This paper examines some neglected implications of altruism in deterministic voting models in settings where voters differ in their altruistic propensities. Of particular interest is the extent to which relatively small groups of altruistic voters can affect electoral outcomes by simply casting...

Previous results on political cycles as a signal of competency assumed that opportunism was common knowledge. If opportunism is not common knowledge, there may be a partially pooling equilibrium where cycles indicate opportunism rather than competency. Insofar as more discretionality increases...

We extend the setup of Arrow's General Possibility Theorem by introducing as additional policy alternatives the possibility to delegate certain decisions to an external institution or random device. We show that in this extended setting there exists a Social Welfare Functional with universal...

We test whether a descriptive norm-nudge is a suitable policy tool to increase cooperation in a social dilemma when decisions are taken by teams, not individuals. 10 Each team in our experiment comes from a different fishing boat at Lake Victoria, Tanzania. The provision of a norm-nudge is...

Recent historical works, most notably 2017's Democracy in Chains, claim that 1986 Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan's formative contributions to political economy were inspired in significant part by hostility to Brown v. Board of Education. This argument suggests that the research agenda of...