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We develop a dynamic model of political competition. Each party has a policymotivated ideological wing and an office-motivated opportunistic wing. A blockade arises if inner-party conflict stops policy implementation. We use this model to study whether early elections should be used to overcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003796136
We develop a dynamic model of political competition. Each party has a policymotivated ideological wing and an office-motivated opportunistic wing. A blockade arises if inner-party conflict stops policy implementation. We use this model to study whether early elections should be used to overcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935643
political agency setting. In the baseline two-period case where only the politician's actions are observable before the election … probability before the election (Maskin and Tirole's "feedback" case). In the three-period case, with two elections, the dynamic … evolution of confirmation bias can lead to more pandering before the first election. Finally, we show that when confirmation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011286492
. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate politicians, yet politicians who are overly interested in re-election …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334365
We develop a simple two period model to study the importance of motivational differences among politicians in describing the role of elections and explaining policy choices. In our model, politicians differ in their motives of running public office. Good politicians care about policies while bad...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343267
One of the most crucial lessons to be taken from the literature on electoral business cycles is that the short- run electorally-induced fluctuations prejudice the long-run welfare. Since the very first studies on the matter, some authors offered suggestions as to what should be done against this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011502336
This paper explores to what extent secondary policy issues are infuenced by electoral incentives. We develop a two dimensional political agency model in which a politician decides on both a frontline policy issue and a secondary policy issue. The model predicts when the incumbent should...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010439364
state tier. This e ffect only materializes in the election year which suggests that mayors under the new electoral rule put … more e ffort into grant applications for highly visible infrastructure projects in order to increase their re-election …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010485272
We use a change in the voting procedures of one of the two chambers of the Swiss parliament to explore how transparency affects the voting behavior of its members. Until 2013, the Council of States (Ständerat) had voted by a show of hands. While publicly observable at the time of the vote,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011411279
We introduce voter uncertainty to the unidimensional spatial model of elections. Strategic voters choose between the status quo and a proposed reform, and there is uncertainty about the location of the reform on the policy space. If each possible location of the reform is on the same side of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012911569