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Cost Sharing in a Job Scheduling Problem

Mishra, Debasis; Rangarajan, Bharath - 2007

A set of jobs need to be served by a server which can serve only one job at a time. Jobs have processing times and incur waiting costs (linear in their waiting time). The jobs share their costs through compensation using monetary transfers. In the first part, we provide an axiomatic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014026948

A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions

Dimitrov, Dinko (contributor); … - 2006

models, Shenoy's (1979) absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions provides a sufficient condition for core existence. We …. (2001) that guarantees nonemptiness of the core in more general models. As it turns out, the top coalition property implies … induced hedonic game satisfies the top coalition property. -- Coalition formation ; Core ; Paradox of smaller coalitions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731198

Cooperative management of groundwater resources in the presence of environmental externalities

Esteban, Encarna; Dinar, Ariel - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 54 (2013) 3, pp. 443-469

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722893

On the non-emptiness of the one-core and the bargaining set of committee games

Kenfack, Joseph Armel Momo; Tchantcho, Bertrand - In: Operations research letters 42 (2014) 2, pp. 113-118

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010364600

Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Özbilen, Seçkin - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014335941

On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules

Haake, Claus-Jochen (contributor); … - 2007

Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731672

Preferences, actions and voting rules

Artabe, Alaitz; Laruelle, Annick; Valenciano, Federico - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 15-28

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506468

Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions

Lange, Fabien; Kóczy, László Á. - 2012

A voting situation is given by a set of voters and the rules of legislation that determine minimal requirements for a group of voters to pass a motion. A priori measures of voting power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf value, show the influence of the individual players in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009546873

Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars H.; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674186

The Egalitarian Sharing Rule in Provision of Public Projects

Bogomolnaia, Anna; Le Breton, Michel; Savvateev, Alexei V. - 2005

cost within jurisdiction. We show that these two principles always yield a core-stable partition but a Nash stable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066238

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