This paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a legislature ascomposed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. Thefloor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented.The policy outcome is ex...

We use a change in the voting procedures of one of the two chambers of the Swiss parliament to explore how transparency affects the voting behavior of its members. Until 2013, the Council of States (Ständerat) had voted by a show of hands. While publicly observable at the time of the vote,...

We study the problem of aggregating private information in elections with two or more alternatives. We characterize environments where information can be aggregated asymptotically by a sequence of equilibria of voting games as the electorate grows large and explore the implications for the...

In recent years, concerns about misinformation in the media have skyrocketed. President Donald Trump has repeatedly claimed that various news outlets are disseminating "fake news" for political purposes. But when the information contained in mainstream media news reports provides no clear clues...

This article considers an asymmetric contest with incomplete information. There are two types of players: informed and uninformed. Each player has a different ability to translate effort into performance in terms of the contest success function. While one player's type is known to both players,...

This multidisciplinary study adopts econometric analysis for investigating how different characteristics determine the choice of the language used in the signs of a shopping street. We work with a dataset containing about 200 observations collected in the main shopping streets of the cities of...