This paper analyzes the political economy of public education and lump-sum transfer in an overlapping-generation model of a two-class society in which the dy- namics of inequality is driven by the accumulation of human capital. The two redistributive policies are determined by voting, while...

This paper analyzes the political economy of public education and in-cash trans- fer in an overlapping generations model of a two-class society in which the dynamics of inequality is driven by the accumulation of human capital. The two redistributive policies are determined by voting, while...

<Para ID="Par1">This study presents an overlapping-generations model with altruism towards children. We characterize a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of voting over two policy issues, public education for the young and social security for the old. The model potentially generates two types of political...</para>

This paper develops an overlapping-generations model with uncertain lifetimes and altruism towards children. The paper characterizes a Markov perfect political equilibrium of voting over two conflicting policy issues, public education for the young and social security for the elderly. The model...

This study presents an overlapping-generations model with altruism towards children. We characterize a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of voting over two policy issues, public education for the young and social security for the old. The model potentially generates two types of political...