This article synthesizes insights from deterrence theory and social psychology literature on retributive justice to develop and test a theoretical model which predicts how and why observers' tax compliance intentions are influenced by knowledge of the punitive outcomes faced by individuals found...

Why so many people pay their taxes, although fines and audit probability are low, has become a central question in the tax compliance literature. A homo economicus, with a more refined motivation structure, helps us to shed light on this puzzle. This paper provides empirical evidence for the...

We synthesize insights from deterrence theory and social psychology literature on retributive justice to develop and test a theoretical model which predicts how and why observers’ tax compliance intentions are influenced by knowledge of others’ punitive outcomes resulting from tax fraud. We...

We empirically analyze the effect of political support for the government on voluntary tax compliance. To this end, we use 33 survey results of the contingent valuation (CV) method developed and widely used for the valuation of non-market goods in the field of environmental economics. The degree...

In this paper, a tax game with audit costs as a public bad is designed to investigate the impact of public disclosure on tax evasion experimentally. Three different types of tax privacy are tested, ranging from complete privacy to full disclosure. We expect to observe two different effects:...