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Efficient incentives with social preferences

Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph - 2022

This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013255847

Efficient incentives with social preferences

Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph - 2022

This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents’ social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents’ social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013269734

Efficient incentives with social preferences

Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 3, pp. 975-999

We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635255

Public Goods with Punishment & Payment for Relative Rank

Burnham, Terence - 2015

A laboratory experiment designed to investigate the role of relative performance-based payoffs on cooperation in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013020278

Public statements of good conduct promote pro-social behavior

Koessler, Ann-Kathrin; Page, Lionel; Dulleck, Uwe - 2018

goods experiment. Using a 'between-within subjects design' we identify three channels by which non-enforceable statements of …-oriented participants are more likely in the experiment to make a public statement. Second, in a commitment effect, participants who make a … statements of good conduct are in our experiment more effective over time. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011876145

Distributional preferences explain individual behavior across games and time

Hedegaard, Morten; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Müller, Daniel; … - 2019

We use a large and heterogeneous sample of the Danish population to investigate the importance of distributional preferences for behavior in a public good game and a trust game. We find robust evidence for the significant explanatory power of distributional preferences. In fact, compared to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012009014

Mechanisms with referrals: VCG mechanisms and multilevel mechanisms

Lee, Joosung - 2017

We study mechanisms for environments in which only some of the agents are directly connected to a mechanism designer and the other agents can participate in a mechanism only through the connected agents' referrals. In such environments, the mechanism designer and agents may have different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660366

The solidarity motive

Engel, Christoph - 2016

For decades, experimental economics has been very interested in behavior that could be characterized as practicing solidarity (although the term is rarely used). Solidarity is a key concept in Catholic Social Teaching. This paper builds a bridge between these two endeavors that, thus far, had...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011553331

Lying About What You Know or About What You Do?

Serra-Garcia, Marta; Damme, Eric E. C. van; Potters, … - 2011

We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information.The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196597

Lying About What You Know or About What You Do?

Serra-Garcia, Marta; Damme, Eric E. C. van; Potters, … - 2015

We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165459