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We analyze communication about the social returns to investment in a public good. We model two agents who have private information about these returns as well as their own taste for cooperation, or social preferences. Before deciding to contribute or not, each agent submits an unverifiable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011801387
We modify the provision point mechanism by introducing reward money, which is distributed among the contributors in proportion to their contributions only when the provision point is not reached. In equilibrium, the provision point is always reached as competition for reward money and preference...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010722771
We study mechanism design problems in quasi-linear environments where the envelope theorem and revenue equivalence principle fail due to non-convex and non-differentiable valuations. We obtain a characterization of incentive compatibility based on the Mirrlees representation of the indirect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010616896
We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information.The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196597
We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165459
Using rebate rules to facilitate public goods provision has become a common practice for many social, economic, and environmental issues. This paper explores the effect of both non-endogenous and endogenous rebate rules on threshold-public goods provision in large groups. We follow the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014078778
We report results from experiments designed to investigate the prevalence of turn-taking in three-person finitely repeated threshold public good games without communication. Individuals can each make a discrete contribution. If the number of contributors is at least equal to the threshold, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963870
We present a natural environment that sustains full cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the sequence, but observe the actions of some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901935
We modify the provision point mechanism by introducing reward money, which is distributed among the contributors in proportion to their contributions only when the provision point is not reached. In equilibrium, the provision point is always reached as competition for reward money and preference...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086030
We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups’ position in the sequence. Contribution decisions are made by players...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014237520