This paper examines the effects of a global club good opportunity on local public good provision when interactions are indefinitely repeated linear public good game setting with a voluntary contribution mechanism. In particular, the study varies the global club entry cost and the local community...

Suppose a group of individuals must decide whether to undertake a public project. The private commodity space, from which are also drawn the inputs for the public good, exhibits the Riesz decomposition property. We give a sufficient condition for the existence of a feasible provision of the...

This paper explores the question whether boundedly rational agents learn to behave optimally when asked to voluntarily contribute to a public good. The decision process of individuals is described by an Evolutionary Algorithm. We analyze the learning process of purely and impurely altruistic...

The optimal income tax model under the threat of migration is extended to include both indirect taxes and public goods. This has enabled us to check that: 1) optimal income tax rates are higher than in the absence of indirect taxes and, at the top of the skills distribution, may be positive; 2)...

In this paper I study optimal demand by an agent who faces a budget constraint that may not be linear. This situation arises in public good economies in which production of the public good does not exhibit constant returns to scale and in which each agent is responsible for a fixed proportion of...

Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant gametheoretic model of an economy with one private good and one public good. Strategies of players consist of voluntary contributions of the private good to public good production. Without relying on first order conditions, the authors...

Sanctioning increases cooperation in public goods games, but not indiscriminately under all conditions and in all societies, and the mechanisms by which sanctioning exercises its impact on behavior are yet to be studied in detail. We show experimentally that in the presence of sanctioning, our...

Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant gametheoretic model of an economy with one private good and one public good. Strategies of players consist of voluntary contributions of the private good to public good production. Without relying on first order conditions, the authors...

Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant gametheoretic model of an economy with one private good and one public good. Strategies of players consist of voluntary contributions of the private good to public good production. Without relying on first order conditions, the authors...

We revisit the classical result that taxation of private consumption is distortionary and therefore precludes the efficient provision of public goods. We introduce a nonlinear consumption tax which we call a ‘tax lottery’. Under this scheme, an ad-valorem consumption tax is supplemented with...