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Cursed beliefs with common-value public goods

Cox, Caleb - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

I show how improper conditioning of beliefs can lead to under-contribution in public goods environments with interdependent values. I consider a simple model of a binary, excludable public good. In equilibrium, provision of the public good is good news about its value. Naive players who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109699

Cursed beliefs with common-value public goods

Cox, Caleb A. - In: Journal of Public Economics 121 (2015) C, pp. 52-65

I show how improper conditioning of beliefs can reduce contribution in public goods environments with interdependent values. I consider a simple model of a binary, excludable public good. In equilibrium, provision of the public good is good news about its value. Naive players who condition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190981

Using an exogenous mechanism to examine efficient probabilistic punishment

Qin, Xiangdong; Wang, Siyu - In: Journal of Economic Psychology 39 (2013) C, pp. 1-10

Free riding can be made more costly by increasing either the probability of being caught or the severity of the punishment. However, neither option is without cost. What is the tradeoff between these strategies? In this study, we introduce an exogenous punishment mechanism that varies the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010730013

Crossing the Point of No Return: A Public Goods Experiment

Fischbacher, Urs; Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

Participants in a public goods experiment receive private or common signals regarding the so-called "point of no return", meaning that if the group's total contribution falls below this point, all payoffs are reduced. An individual faces the usual conflict between private and collective...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009644963

Common and private signals in public goods games with a point of no return

Gueth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Soraperra, Ivan - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Facoltà di Economia - 2015

We provide experimental evidence on behavior in a public goods game featuring a so-called point of no return, meaning that if the group’s total contribution falls below this point all payoffs are reduced. Participants receive either common or private signals about the point of no return, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011251917

Individual Evolutionary Learning, Other-regarding Preferences, and the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism

Arifovic, Jasmina; Ledyard, John - Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University - 2012

The data from experiments with the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism suggest five stylized facts, including the restart … does. In addition, our theory answers some open questions concerning the data on partners-strangers experiments. One … generated by our model are quantitatively similar to data from a variety of experiments, and experimenters, and are insensitive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818162

How Large Should the 'Bullet' Be? Dissecting the Role of Unilateral and Tie Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods

Liu, Jia - 2017

This paper evaluates the role of centralized punishment in boosting contribution to the provision of public goods. To avoid the race to the bottom in the provision of public goods, this centralized punishment mechanism relies on the use of the unilateral and tie punishment imposed on the lowest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951079

Hiding an Inconvenient Truth : Lies and Vagueness

Serra-Garcia, Marta - 2015

We examine communication in a 2-player sequential public good game in which the leader has private information about the return from contributing to it. The leader decides first and the follower observes the leader's contribution, before deciding whether or not to contribute. Without...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038656

Truth or efficiency? Communication in a sequential public good game

Serra-Garcia, Marta (contributor); … - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003807183

Privately contributing to public goods over time: An experimental study

Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas - 2002

Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310565