Voluntary contribution games are a classic social dilemma in which the individually dominant strategies result in a poor performance of the population. However, the negative zero-contribution predictions from these types of social dilemma situations give way to more positive (near-)efficient...

At its core, this dissertation examines the role of information, particularly as it relates to proxies for quality, and how it affects both donor and organization decision processes in the humanitarian space. In Chapter 2 I consider the context of competition within the sub-sector of...

This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...

In this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...

Problems which can only be resolved through international cooperation are increasing. Due to this increase, states cooperate more than ever with each other and with international organizations (IOs) but often insufficiently to solve the problems. When social scientists analyze the potential for...

Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game theory predictions. However, those models...