We experimentally investigate how different information about others' individual contributions affects conditional … cooperators' willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual … contributions is provided, contributions are generally higher than when only average information is available. This effect is …

We experimentally investigate the impact of visibility of contributors and cost of information on public good …, even when viewing contributors' information is costly. This effect holds even though the identities of contributors are …

We experimentally investigate how different information about others' individual contributions affects conditional … cooperators' willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual … contributions is provided, contributions are generally higher than when only average information is available. This effect is …

We experimentally investigate how different information about others’ individual contributions affects conditional … cooperators’ willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual … contributions is provided, contributions are generally higher than when only average information is available. This effect is …

We provide a direct test of the role of social preferences in voluntary cooperation. We elicit individuals' cooperation … novel test as to whether there are "types" of players who behave consistently with their elicited preferences. We find clear …

control treatments, receive information resulting from the previous period's evaluations. There are three information … treatments: Participants receive information either about their own evaluation or about their partner's evaluation or both …. Although participants condition their contributions on their partners' evaluations, this information alone is insufficient to …