We study a continuous-time problem of optimal public good contribution under uncertainty for an economy with a finite number of agents. Each agent can allocate his wealth between private consumption and repeated but irreversible contributions to increase the stock of some public good. We study...

The open source paradigm is often defined as a collaborative effort, implying that firms and consumers come together in a non-competitive climate. We show here that open source development can arise from a competitive climate. Under competition, we find that open source is the surplus maximizing...

Despite a widespread interest in the warm glow model [Andreoni (1989,1990)], surprisingly most attention focused on the voluntary contribution equilibrium of the model, and only very little attention has been devoted to the competitive equilibrium. In this paper, we introduce the notion of...

The paper applies and elaborates contractual approach to study economies with a production sector. Economies with convex, non-convex production and with public goods are considered. The notions and terms of barter contractual approach developed in Marakulin (2003a) for exchange economies are now...

In general equilibrium theory for private good economies, possible discontinuities in budget correspondences create obstacles to decentralizing Pareto efficient allocations, as well as to existence of Walrasian equilibrium with gains from trade. Then McKenzie's (1957) notion of compensated...

In a production economy, multiple public goods are produced by firms in competitive markets, and provided by the government together with contributions from consumers. There are widespread externalities: all consumers' consumption and contributions and all firms' production enter into utility...

This introduces the symposium on general equilibrium.

We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out preexisting federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other...

We show that the imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds outs pre-existing federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of...

We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out pre-existing federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other...