We study experimentally voluntary contributions to public goods when none, some, or all previous decisions are observable. When agents observe previous moves, they tend to condition their cooperation on observed cooperation. This leads to two effects of increased transparency: on the one hand,...

Transparency in teams can induce cooperation. We study contribution decisions by agents when previous decisions can be observed. We find that an information chain, in which each agent directly observes only the decision of her immediate predecessor, is at least as effective as a...

Post-grant validity challenges at patent offices rely on the private initiative of third parties to correct mistakes made by patent offices. We hypothesize that incentives to bring post-grant validity challenges are reduced when many firms benefit from revocation of a patent and when firms are...

There is a heightened lack of clarity and understanding about the new U.S. business forms both in terms of theory and practice, especially with regard to relative priorities of social good (or the absence thereof), decision-making, and meaningful accountability thereto (or the lack thereof). As...

The last decade has seen a growing interest among economists on the effect of diversity on the provision of social goods and the stock of social capital. Indeed, in the workplace, cooperation, trust, and other social goods may be important elements of the smooth functioning of an office, but...

The paper gives a detailed account of industrial relations issues as public entities in Fiji journey into reforms. Though given little attention locally, what accompanies this journey is the repeated industrial relation concerns. This theme is empirically exemplified by a reformed Government...

This short paper extends the analysis of Morgan and Tumlinson (2018) to the setting of a small open economy. We show that in this economy featuring endogenous free entry of firms: (1) Both the number and production of firms is socially optimal. Furthermore production is efficient --- it...

Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) presented a continuous dynamic public good game model and solved the model for feedback Nash-equilibria. Wirl (1996) extended the model and considered nonlinear strategies. Both models do not include uncertainty and hence neglect an important factor in the theory of...