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Collective commitment
Roessler, Christian; Shelegia, Sandro; Strulovici, Bruno - 2014
? Under an intuitive condition linking power structures in the dynamic setting and at the commitment stage, the answer is … equilibrium without commitment. The condition is also necessary: when it fails, as in the case of a single time-inconsistent agent …, commitment is valuable for some payoffs. We apply our result to explain inefficient collective decisions in the contexts of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011375836
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Consuming Your Way to Efficiency : Public Goods Provision Through Non-Distortionary Tax Lotteries
Giebe, Thomas - 2013
We revisit the classical result that financing a pure public good through taxation of private consumption is inefficient. To this standard setup we add a consumption contest in which consumers can win a prize. We show that an appropriately chosen contest — which we call a ‘tax lottery' —...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082023
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Consuming your way to efficiency : public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries
Giebe, Thomas; Schweinzer, Paul - 2013
We revisit the classical result that financing a pure public good through taxation of private consumption is inefficient. To this standard setup we add a consumption contest in which consumers can win a prize. We show that an appropriately chosen contest - which we call a 'tax lottery' - can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009742905
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Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency for Small Domains of Preferences Over Public Goods
Schummer, James - 1999
It has long been known that when agents have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries, there is an incompatibility between strategy-proofness and efficiency (Gibbard, [9]; Hylland, [12]) - a solution satisfying those properties must be dictatorial. We strengthen this result by showing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014194818
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From Good Institutions to Generous Citizens : Top-Down Incentives to Cooperate Promote Subsequent Prosociality But Not Norm Enforcement
Stagnaro, Michael; Arechar, Antonio; Rand, David G. - 2017
What makes people willing to pay costs to help others, and to punish others’ selfishness? Why does the extent of such behaviors vary markedly across cultures? To shed light on these questions, we explore the role of formal institutions in shaping individuals’ prosociality and punishment. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035336
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Harnessing Reciprocity to Promote Cooperation and the Provisioning of Public Goods
Rand, David G.; Yoeli, Erez; Hoffman, Moshe - 2015
How can we maximize the common good? This is a central organizing question of public policy design, across political parties and ideologies. The answer typically involves the provisioning of public goods such as fresh air, national defense, and knowledge. Public goods are costly to produce but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014037089
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Public-good provision in large economies : robust incentive compatibility, immunity to robustly blocking coalitions, and voting
Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - 2015
In a large economy, a first-best provison rule for a public good is robustly implementable with budget balance because no one individual alone can affect the aggregate outcome. First-best outcomes can, however, be blocked by coalitions of agents acting in concert. With a requirement of immunity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334017
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The political agenda effect and state centralization
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar - 2016
removing the commitment value of a non-centralized state), and how elites may sometimes prefer partial state centralization …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011572952
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Endogenous strategic issue linkage in international negotiations
Carraro, Carlo; Marchiori, Carmen - 2003
This paper analyses issue linkage as a way to increase co-operation on issues where incentives to free-ride are strong. The goal is to determine under what conditions players prefer to link negotiations on two different issues rather than to negotiate on the two issues separately. Suppose that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591418
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A Network Approach to Public Goods
Elliott, Matthew - 2019
outcome, a weighted, directed network describing marginal externalities is defined. We show that Pareto efficient outcomes are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904900