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The impact of sleep restriction on contributions and punishment : first evidence
Clark, Jeremy; Dickinson, David L. - 2017
individual's likelihood of sending costly peer punishment is examined. Actigraphy sleep monitoring watches are used to validate …-parametric as well as regression analysis, we find that when punishment is not available, sleep restriction does not affect the … contributions made to joint production. When punishment is available, we find weak evidence that SR subjects contribute more than WR …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011670941
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Anger management : aggression and punishment in the provision of public goods
Gee, Laura K.; Lyu, Xinxin; Urry, Heather - 2017
welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger about free-riding. If this is the case, then tools that regulate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607404
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Peers or police? : detection and sanctions in the provision of public goods
DeAngelo, Gregory; Gee, Laura K. - 2018
Sanctions are a common method to discourage free-riding in the provision of public goods. However, we can usually only sanction those who are detected performing the bad act of free-riding. There has been considerable research on the type of sanctions imposed, but this research almost always...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865465
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Anger management : aggression and punishment in the provision of public goods
Gee, Laura K.; Lyu, Xinxin; Urry, Heather - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-28
welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger about free-riding. If this is the case, then tools that regulate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621328
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Promoting cooperation : the distribution of reward and punishment power
Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - 2012
monitors'). We review the literature on the relative merits of punishment and rewards when the distribution of incentive power … evidence showing how concentrating reward/punishment power in one group member affects cooperation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578208
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Common and private signals in public goods games with a point of no return
Gueth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Soraperra, Ivan - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Facoltà di Economia - 2015
We provide experimental evidence on behavior in a public goods game featuring a so-called point of no return, meaning that if the group’s total contribution falls below this point all payoffs are reduced. Participants receive either common or private signals about the point of no return, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011251917
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Crossing the Point of No Return: A Public Goods Experiment
Fischbacher, Urs; Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
Participants in a public goods experiment receive private or common signals regarding the so-called "point of no return", meaning that if the group's total contribution falls below this point, all payoffs are reduced. An individual faces the usual conflict between private and collective...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009644963
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Cursed beliefs with common-value public goods
Cox, Caleb - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
I show how improper conditioning of beliefs can lead to under-contribution in public goods environments with interdependent values. I consider a simple model of a binary, excludable public good. In equilibrium, provision of the public good is good news about its value. Naive players who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109699
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Cursed beliefs with common-value public goods
Cox, Caleb A. - In: Journal of Public Economics 121 (2015) C, pp. 52-65
I show how improper conditioning of beliefs can reduce contribution in public goods environments with interdependent values. I consider a simple model of a binary, excludable public good. In equilibrium, provision of the public good is good news about its value. Naive players who condition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190981
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Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability
Ambrus, Attila; Greiner, Ben - 2015
punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, relative to … individual peer-to-peer punishment. Democratic punishment leads to more cooperation and higher average payoffs, both under … perfect and imperfect monitoring of contributions, primarily by curbing anti-social punishment and thereby establishing a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510711