exit mechanism, whereby the opportunity to leave the partnership can be used as a threat against free-riders. We examine … on provision only through the exit mechanism. Assortative selection of interaction partners seems to play a minor role in … our setting, whereas the threat of costly exit is a powerful force to discipline free-riding. …

cooperation through two mechanisms: an entry mechanism, which leads to assortative selection of interaction partners, or an exit … that voluntary participation has a positive effect on public good provision through the exit mechanism, but we do not find …, whereas the threat of costly exit is a powerful force to discipline free-riding. …

, to exit one's group, or to form larger groups through mergers involving the consent of both merging groups. We find a …

project or working on their own. There is excessive exit as subjects overestimate the likelihood their partner will leave …. High barriers to exit thus improve welfare. We observe that exit is driven by failure within the common project but also by … exit costs across treatments. …