Showing 1 - 10 of 2,767
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304947
Social norms are a ubiquitous feature of social life and pervade almost every aspect of human social interaction. However, despite their importance we still have relatively little empirical knowledge about the forces that drive the formation, the maintenance and the decay of social norms. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011854858
We test a mechanism whereby groups are formed voluntarily, through the use of voting. These groups play a public-goods game, where efficiency increases with group size (up to a limit, in one treatment). It is feasible to exclude group members, to exit one's group, or to form larger groups...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776752
For decades, experimental economics has been very interested in behavior that could be characterized as practicing solidarity (although the term is rarely used). Solidarity is a key concept in Catholic Social Teaching. This paper builds a bridge between these two endeavors that, thus far, had...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011553331
We study the interplay between leading-by-example and group identity in a public goods game experiment. A common … identity between the leader and her followers is beneficial for cooperation: average contributions are more than 30% higher … than in a treatment where no identity was induced. In two further treatments we study the effects of heterogeneous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535527
. -- formal sanctions ; informal sanctions ; experiment ; voting ; cooperation ; punishment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008908893
chosen by voting. -- Sanction ; social dilemma ; public goods ; voluntary contribution mechanism ; punishment ; experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008908902
, we conduct a novel time-pressure experiment to shed light on the cognitive underpinnings of cooperation. Although we find …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011458007
Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self‐interest should produce a sub‐optimal outcome absent sanctions for non‐cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130732
The sanctioning of norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing informal sanctions, by contrast,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130734