decisions about the level of the public good. We derive the following results: i) Political competition is a necessary but not a … select institutions which restrict the power of politicians. iii) In conjunction with political competition, these …

two candidates electoral competition over public consumption, with a two dimensional policy space and two dimensions of …

restrictions on candidate entry need not necessarily reduce electoral competition. In fact, when group sizes are asymmetric …, affirmative action may increase electoral competition and consequently, improve provision of public goods. This happens because in … problem. Affirmative action eliminates this problem and increases within-group competition. We study a randomized caste based …

We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our …

distortionary tax. We demonstrate the possibility that yardstick competition itself fails to restrict rent seeking. We complement … static case. -- Yardstick competition ; rent-seeking ; public good ; electoral incentives …