Showing 1 - 10 of 2,470
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011886306
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014514886
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015066995
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009620765
In a door-to-door fundraising field experiment, we study the impact of fundraising mechanisms on charitable giving. We approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non-anonymous voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM), or an anonymous VCM. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386444
Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished from standard ones by the patents being non-rivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption--that is, they are club goods. This affects the way coalitional bidding impacts auction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013249971
The double-oral auction and voluntary contribution mechanism experiments are the two most commonly used classroom experiments. In addition to running these experiments to illustrate market equilibrium and free riding, variations can be introduced to demonstrate more complex points. Several...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014150697
A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to each group, which is not commonly known. We investigate an auction mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065955
An important result in convex analysis is the duality between a closed convex set and its support function. We exploit this duality to develop a novel geometric approach to mechanism design. For a general class of social choice problems we characterize the feasible set, which is closed and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009741027
A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness (Güth and Kliemt, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009736802