This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also the intention underlying this action. The theory...

In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players’ benefit...

Public good provision is often local and also affects bystanders. Is provision harder if contributions harm bystanders, and is provision easier if outsiders gain a windfall profit? In an experiment we observe that both positive and negative externalities reduce provision levels whenever actors...

This paper studies the impact of inequity aversion preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) in a "repeated" public goods game. We assume that agents care about the expected payoff differences among themselves over all periods of a game, so that it is in fact a dynamic game that is being played. In...