We consider a two-person Cournot game of voluntary contributions to a public good with identical individual preferences, and examine equilibrium aggregate welfare under a separable, symmetric and concave social welfare function. Assuming the public good is pure, Itaya, de Meza and Myles (Econ....

We consider the class of linear voluntary contribution games under the general assumption of heterogeneous endowments. In this context, we assess the performance of the Galbraith Mechanism (GM) relative to a fixed equal sharing allocation in both theory and experiments. Three main empirical...

We consider the class of linear voluntary contribution games under the general assumption of heterogeneous endowments. In this context, we assess the performance of the Galbraith Mechanism (GM) relative to a fixed equal sharing allocation in both theory and experiments. Three main empirical...

We consider a two-person Cournot game of voluntary contributions to a public good with identical individual preferences, and examine equilibrium aggregate welfare under a separable, symmetric and concave social welfare function. Assuming the public good is pure, Itaya, de Meza and Myles (Econ....

Wealthy individuals often voluntarily provide public goods that the poor also consume. Such philanthropy is perceived as legitimizing one’s wealth. Governments routinely exempt the rich from taxation on grounds of their charitable expenditure. We examine the normative logic of this exemption....