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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003820405
The core of a monotonic transferable utility (TU) game is shown to be the set of prices that incentivize each … public goods. It is also shown that the core is the intersection of superdifferentials evaluated at the grand coalition of … the covers of person-specific TU games derived from the original game. These characterizations of the core demonstrate how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012862785
Selected applications of the NTU Shapley value to settings other than that of general equilibrium in perfect competition. Three models are considered: Taxation and Redistribution, Public Goods, and Fixed Prices. In each case, the value leads to significant conceptual insights which, while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024487
In the two-person sequential best shot game, first player 1 contributes to a public good and then player 2 is informed about this choice before contributing. The payoff from the public good is the same for both players and depends only on the maximal contribution. Efficient voluntary cooperation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010252393
define a cost allocation by means of three egalitarian principles, and show that this allocation is an element of the core of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012729175
We suggest that the propensity for altruistic punishment and reward is an emergent property that has co-evolved with cooperation and has provided efficient feedback measured in social dilemma and public good experiments. A simple cost/benefit analysis at the level of single agents, who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012731195
Group tasks are often organized by a list: group members state their willingness to contribute by entering their names on a publicly visible, empty list. Alternatively, one could organize the group task by starting with a full list: every group member is already entered on the list and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011779277
cost within jurisdiction. We show that these two principles always yield a core-stable partition but a Nash stable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066238
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003946768
on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous … sacrifice") which is derived from the egalitarian-equivalent concept suggested by Moulin (1987). We also develop a simple core … test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible outcome of a cooperative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003983187