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An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856702
We enrich the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model of strategic communication between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver by adding repeated interactions and voluntary transfer payments. Transfers play two roles here: they incentivise decision-making and signal information. Although full...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013015710
We enrich a cheap-talk game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver by adding repeated interactions and voluntary transfer payments. Transfers play two roles here: they motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full separation can always...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012926233
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision‐making and signal the sender's information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium,...
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We consider a standard persuasion problem in which the receiver’s action and the state of the world are both one-dimensional. Fully characterizing optimal signals when utilities are non-linear is a daunting task. Instead, we develop a general approach to understanding a key qualitative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014031929
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver’s decision-making and signal the sender’s information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014033519