We examine the hold-up problem of price regulation and compare it with the monetary policy credibility problem. For both, reputational solutions are possible provided that the policymaker is sufficiently far-sighted, but the hold-up problem in regulation turns out to be more serious than the...

Regulatory independence has been proposed as a mechanism to alleviate the commitment problem associated to the sunk nature of investments in network industries, including telecommunications. This paper summarizes the authors’ and others’ work in this field (in a pause to take stock of...

This paper explores the similarity of the underlying economic problems that lead to the establishment of (a) independent central banks to operate national monetary policies and (b) independent regulatory agencies for telecommunications and other utility service industries. We show that, in both...

Regulatory independence has been proposed as a mechanism to alleviate the commitment problem associated to the sunk nature of investments in network industries. This paper summarizes the author's and others' work in this field (in a pause to take stock of several years of research) and, in...

This paper presents new developments in the economics of federalism to analyze the determinants of specific investments in network industries and the interaction between structural and behavioral regulation. Central or federal policy making is more focused and especialized and makes it more...