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Optimal punishment for repeat offenders when the government can and cannot commit to sanctions

Emons, Winand - In: Frontiers in the economics of environmental regulation …, (pp. 155-171). 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003355840

Escalating penalties for repeat offenders

Emons, Winand - In: International review of law and economics 27 (2007) 2, pp. 170-178

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003568819

Subgame perfect punishment for repeat offenders

Emons, Winand (contributor) - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002601605

Escalating penalties for repeat offenders

Emons, Winand (contributor) - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002604461

Subgame-perfect punishment for repeat offenders

Emons, Winand - In: Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic … 42 (2004) 3, pp. 496-502

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002141301

Escalating penalties for repeat offenders

Emons, Winand - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001872430

The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion

Emons, Winand - In: International journal of industrial organization 70 (2020), pp. 1-9

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012586710

The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion

Emons, Winand - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012003835

The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion

Emons, Winand - 2018 - Version: October 2018

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an investigation. Firms pick the degree of collusion: The more they collude, the higher are profits, but so is the probability of detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits against...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011919342

Subgame perfect punishment for repeat offenders

Emons, Winand - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013424230