experiment. The experiment is designed to test whether nonmonetary sanctions or rewards alone can yield the optimal level of …, are used as proxies for nonmonetary sanction and reward, respectively. Although these ratings are costless and payoff … neutral, results show that expression of disapproval facilitates coordination on the most efficient equilibrium. In contrast …

By means of a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment … mechanism within a one-shot binary trust game. The experiment comprises three games. In the first one, the only equilibrium … where everybody trusts and reciprocates. In the third game, the collective punishment mechanism is adopted through majority …

We elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link …) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment … behavior across the two environments within subject, we observe a high degree of individuals’ punishment type stability …

Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether informal monetary sanctions can lead to better coordination in a …-statistic game ; punishment ; sanction ; weakest link … repeated minimum effort coordination game. While most groups first experience inefficient coordination, the efficiency …

reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the …Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes … cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where …

We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate … irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free … riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is …

We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate … irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free … riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is …