We analyze a two-sender quality-signaling game in a duopoly model where goods are horizontally and vertically differentiated. While locations are chosen under quality undertainty, firms choose prices and advertising expenditures being privately informed about their thpes. We show that pure price...

We show that a private label is an indirect mean to contract on quality in a vertical structure, and is signed by a downstream firm only when its bargaining power is high. When its bargaining power decreases, sharing the fixed cost of quality in a private label with the upstream firm is not...

The role of grading is to disclose the quality of individual units of output. Each firm produces high and low quality units in different proportions. Quality specification is a choice variable and, all producers have access to the same technology. The paper finds that greater access to grading,...

We propose a structural empirical approach à la Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to disentangle the effect of experts' grades from the effect of unobserved quality on the pricing of experience goods. Using a panel data set of 108 châteaux selling wine on the Bordeaux "en primeur" market, we provide...