We consider a two-agent hierarchical organization with a leader and a manager in a reputation-signaling model. The manager proposes an innovative but risky project to the leader, and decides whether to exert an effort to improve the value of the project, which benefits the organization. The...

How much do a manager's interpersonal skills with subordinates, what we call people management skills, affect employee outcomes, and are managers rewarded for having such skills? Using personnel data and surveys of employees about their managers at a large, high-tech firm, we show that...

We examine the job design decision in the context of skill development and bargaining power. The choice between specialization and multitasking requires employees to develop either specialized or varied task-specifc skills. Employees (i.e., the owners of the acquired skills) bargaining power...

This paper draws on occupational choice theory to explain that observed differences in shares of entrepreneurs as self-employed across countries, may respond to differences in social capital as a support of generalized trust. With a (incomplete) panel data from 63 countries, for a period of 25...

Abstract: This study investigates the relative significance of both the social interaction index (SII) and demographic variables by analysing their association to the likelihood in classifying an auditor as internal or external to the firm. This study uses the psychometric technique of the...

Does the matching between workers and jobs help explain productivity differentials across firms? To address this question we develop a job-worker allocation quality measure (JAQ) by combining employer-employee administrative data with machine learning techniques. The proposed measure is...

What happens when employers would like to screen their employees but only observe a subset of output? We specify a model in which heterogeneous employees respond by producing more of the observed output at the expense of the unobserved output. Though this substitution distorts output in the...

What happens when employers would like to screen their employees but only observe a subset of output? We specify a model in which heterogeneous employees respond by producing more of the observed output at the expense of the unobserved output. Though this substitution distorts output in the...

We study optimal non-linear contracts offered by two firms competing for the exclusive services of workers, who are privately informed about their ability and motivation. Firms differ in their organizational form, and motivated workers are keen to be hired by the non-profit firm because they...