This paper is aimed at assesssing the empirical relevance of the new theory of regulation inspired by the theory of incentives. It contributes to the econometrics of asymmetric information models by using the principal-agent framework for studying the regulatory schemes used in French urban...

This article suggests that the global inefficiency which generally affects a production process is endogenous and depends on the incentives generated by the process environment. We propose to treat the usual correlation between the inefficiency and the regressors of the production frontier...

The paper discusses how conflicts between the multiple objectives of policymakers (efficiency, equity, fiscal, speed of reform, signaling...) can influence the optimal design of concessions contracts for network services in infrastructure. The discussion covers the relevance of information...

Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have started to populate also regulated sector. Their linked international activities and credible threats to relocate are then new concerns for regulators. We sutdy a multiprincipal model in which a privately informed MNE (the agent) produces for two countries...

We show that a regulator can use diffuse information held by potential entrants in the market as a powerful incentive instrument even when neither government tranfers to firms nor the regulation of entrants is permitted. Optimal regulation involves a menu of price caps and price floors. The...

We study how optimal contracts are modified when the agent has the possibility to acquire information before the contract is offered to him. We consider a situation in which this information is always available to the agent just before producing. Therefore, prior information acquisition is...

This paper investigates the determinants of the structure of the banking industry by fitting a monopolistic competition model to a sample of banks drawn from eight EEC countries over 1989-1993. In the theoretical model, banks decide strategically both entry and the branching size of their...