We study equilibrium selection in a common-interest voting model with three alternatives. In the model, symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibria (BNE) of varying efficiency are known to exist. Employing evolutionary adaptive learning simulations, we find interesting new equilibria. In simulations, we...

In an environment with dispersed information, how much can agents learn from past endogenous aggregate outcomes such as prices or output? We show that, in a rational expectations equilibrium, two possible regimes can arise endogenously: a perfect revealing regime and a confounding regime. The...

We investigate a quantitative Aumann's Agreement Theorem and provide a generalization of the characterization in Arieli et al. (2021) from binary state spaces to arbitrary finite state spaces. Using a network flow approach, we show that the cut condition for a feasible multiflow problem gives...

We propose a criterion of stability for two-sided markets with asymmetric information. A central idea is to formulate matching functions, off-path beliefs conditional on counterfactual pairwise deviations, and on-path beliefs in the absence of such deviations. A matching-belief configuration is...

This paper examines implications of incorporating labor market search and matching frictions into a sticky price model for determinacy and E-stability of rational expectations equilibrium (REE) under interest rate policy. When labor adjustment takes place solely at the extensive margin,...