We develop a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibria to be determinate in a class of forward-looking Markov-switching rational expectations models, and we develop an algorithm to check these conditions in practice. We use three examples, based on the new Keynesian model of...

In many professional labor markets the number of new workers follows a cyclical time path. This phenomenon is usually explained by means of a cobweb model that is based on the assumptions of myopic wage expectations and occupational immobility. Since both assumptions are questioned by the...

The endowment effect, status quo bias, and loss aversion are robust and well documented results from experimental psychology. They introduce a wedge between the prices at which one is willing to sell or buy a good. The objective of this paper is to address this wedge. We show that the presence...

This paper describes a method for solving a class of forward-looking Markov-switching Rational Expectations models under noisy measurement, by specifying the unobservable expectations component as a general-measurable function of the observable states of the system, to be determined optimally...

Sticky-price models with rational expectations fail to capture the inertia in US inflation Models with backward-looking expectations capture current inflation behavior but are unlikely to fit other monetary regimes This paper seeks to overcome these problems with a near-rational model of...

We extend the model by DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006, EER) by currency transaction taxes. This model explains the exchange rate behavior by the interaction of heterogeneous traders who display either trend chasing behavior or rely on a return of the exchange rate back to its arbitrage free...

The purpose of this paper is to solve linear dynamic rational expectations models with anticipated shocks by using the generalized Schur decomposition method. We also determine the optimal unrestricted and restricted policy responses to temporary as well as permanent shocks which both are...

The paper shows that being able to forecast another player's actual cooperation better than pure chance can change players' strategic incentives in a one-shot simultaneous PD-situation. In particular, it is shown that if both players have such ability (to forecast each others' actual choices...

Players from two populations, predictors and predictees, are randomly matched in a game--theoretic version of Newcomb's Problem. Predictors are able to predict the predictees' choices by observing their type. There are two types of predictees, those who take their predictability into account by...

This paper investigates the role that imperfect knowledge about the structure of the economy plays in the formation of expectations, macroeconomic dynamics, and the efficient formulation of monetary policy. Economic agents rely on an adaptive learning technology to form expectations and to...