This paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks, and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a risk-shifting problem, bail-out expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more...

This paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks, and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a risk-shifting problem, bail-out expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more...

We review the recent literature on the determinants and effects of housing market expectations. We begin by providing an overview of existing surveys that elicit housing market expectations, and discuss how those surveys may be expanded in the future. We then document a number of facts about...

How should a manager optimally choose transfers to incentivize multiple agents both to collect and to share costly information? To answer this question we study a simple model with a principal and two agents. The agents can obtain costly signals and communicate with each another via...