We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...

Level-k thinking and Cognitive Hierarchy have been widely applied as a normalform solution concept in behavioral and experimental game theory. We consider the extension of level-k thinking to extensive-form games. Player's may learn about levels of opponents' thinking during the play of the game...

We fuse a social dilemma game and a game pitting the group against nature, where the group's probability of avoiding disaster depends on the resources it raises from members. The result is the Nederlander-Prisoner's Dilemma Game where the cost of failure is equally shared. We introduce the...

We devise a new experimental game by nesting a voluntary contributions mechanism in a broader spectrum of incentive schemes. With it, we study tensions between egalitarianism, equity concerns, self-interest, and the need for incentives. In a 2x2 design, subjects either vote on or exogenously...

This paper reports the results of experiments designed to test whether and to what extent individuals succumb to the conjunction fallacy. Using the Kahneman and Tversky (1983) experimental design, we find that given mild incentives, the proportion of individuals who violate the conjunction...

The three-door problem is an astounding example of a systematic violation of a key rationality postulate. In this seemingly simple individual decision task, most people initially fail to correctly apply Bayes' Law, and to make the payoff-maximizing choice. Previous experimental studies have...